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The Next Frontier in Drone Law: Liability for 
Cybersecurity Negligence and Data Breaches for 
UAS Operators 
JOSEPH J. VACEK* 
ABSTRACT 
While questions related to UAS operations and use in government 
surveillance have been discussed at length, the legal ramifications of 
cybersecurity negligence and data breaches for UAS operators have yet to 
be addressed.  In Part I, this article seeks to explore those areas by 
discussing the UAS data chain.  Vulnerabilities in this data chain specific 
to UAS and in general are explored, followed by an examination of the 
state of the law related to the collection, use, retention, and dissemination 
of data.  Part I concludes with an overview of current voluntary “Best 
Practice” documents offering guidance for collecting and managing data.  
Part II of this article applies Article III standing requirements and 
third-party liability limitations to the cybersecurity negligence and data 
breach issues.  Existing federal law does not address liability for 
cybersecurity negligence or data breaches in UAS operations.  This, 
combined with current interpretations of Article III standing requirements 
and a lack of a required standard of care for UAS operators to protect 
against cyber attack by third parties, results in the lack of a legal remedy 
for people whose private data is captured by drone and later compromised 
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aviation law, space law, and aviation technical and policy classes at the undergraduate, 
honors, and graduate levels.  The author’s primary research relates to UAS (drones) in the 
field of aviation law, including remote sensing, constitutional law related to search and 
seizure, privacy and data security, and civil issues such as tort and insurance law.  He holds 
commercial pilot and certified flight instructor certificates and is a practicing lawyer, a 
former Peace Corps volunteer, and an entrepreneur.  He is the faculty advisor for the UND 
competition aerobatic flying team.  The author thanks the Campbell Law Review for 
excellent assistance and professionalism throughout the editing process for this Article.  
Specifically, Landon Van Winkle, Chief Articles Editor, demonstrated truly excellent legal 
and scholarly work in the editing process.  It has been truly an honor to engage in thought 
with him and his team, the next generation in our learned profession. 
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in a cybersecurity breach.  Thus, it appears UAS operators are effectively 
shielded from liability for data breaches beyond the UAS operation and in 
flight data collection.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the last five years, Unmanned Aircraft System (“UAS”) use by 
amateurs, journalists, businesses, and governmental actors has increased 
exponentially.1  Their activities have resulted in the production of very 
large quantities of private or sensitive imagery and an uncountable 
accumulation of data related to such imagery.2  Specifically, imagery from 
 
 1. The capabilities of UAS as cheap, efficient platforms upon which various remote 
sensing equipment can be mounted has led to the exponential increase in use.  See Craigi, 
The Drone Report 2016, DRONE FLYERS (Aug. 21, 2015), http://www.droneflyers.com/
2015/08/the-drone-report-2016/ [https://perma.cc/6FUD-8K9Z]. 
 2.  See Craigi, Best Selling Camera Drones on Amazon – December 2016, DRONE 
FLYERS (Dec. 1, 2016), http://www.droneflyers.com/2016/12/best-selling-camera-drones-
amazon-december-2016/ [https://perma.cc/ZB8F-7STE] (estimating that DJI, which holds 
approximately 75% of the market share in consumer drones, will see sales of its drones top 
1.5 million units in 2016-2017); Leo Sun, Should Xiaomi be Worth More than DJI 
Innovations?, MOTLEY FOOL (Jul. 12, 2016), http://www.fool.com/investing/2016/07/12/
should-xiaomi-be-worth-more-than-dji-innovations.aspx [https://perma.cc/4RV5-J3DP] 
(calling DJI Innovations the “biggest drone maker in the world,” estimating its market value 
2
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol39/iss1/3
2017] THE NEXT FRONTIER IN DRONE LAW 137 
UAS platforms can include images or video in startlingly high-definition, 
offering a valuable perspective to enthusiasts, businesses, and government 
agencies.3  For example, UAS imagery has been used by animal rights 
organizations to monitor hunters,4 by the film industry to capture new 
perspectives,5 and by law enforcement operations to apprehend criminal 
suspects.6  Along with imagery, associated data—such as GPS coordinates 
of the imagery, or network traffic—can be gathered through UAS use.7 
Such activities were rather limited until late 2016.  Prior to August 29, 
2016, drone operators needed either a “certificate of authorization”8 or an 
exemption9 from regular flight regulations to fly legally and avoid civil and 
criminal penalties.  This changed on August 29, 2016, when Federal 
 
at $8 billion, and further noting that DJI employs some 5,000 people worldwide and 
reported 2014 gross revenues of $500 million).  
 3. See, e.g., Lindsey T. Anderson, Note, The Sky’s the Limit: UAS Regulations and 
Changing Applications in Agriculture, 8 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC. & NAT’L RESOURCE L. 401, 
405–06 (2015-2016) (discussing current uses of UAS, including “law enforcement, 
firefighting, border patrol, disaster relief, search and rescue, and military training[,]” by BP 
to monitor an oil pipeline in Alaska, and by film production firms in Hollywood for aerial 
shots on movie sets).  See also id. at 410–12 (discussing the future application of UAS 
technology in precision agriculture, including monitoring fields for overwatering, pesticide 
overuse or deficiency, as well as instant assessment of crop damage following heavy rains in 
flooded fields); GLENNON J. HARRISON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. R42938, UNMANNED 
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS): MANUFACTURING TRENDS 5 tbl.1 (2013), https://fas.org/
sgp/crs/natsec/R42938.pdf [https://perma.cc/UH45-3BS2] (listing twenty nonmilitary 
applications for UAS, including traffic monitoring, damage assessment, aerial photography, 
and sporting events coverage). 
 4. Alisa Mullins, Hunters Watch Out: PETA’s Drones Are Flying, PETA (Oct. 21, 
2013), http://www.peta.org/blog/hunters-watch-out-petas-drones-are-flying/ [https://perma
.cc/7DK9-JPCC]. 
 5. See AERIAL MOB, http://aerialmob.com/ [https://perma.cc/3JYG-S6XU]. 
 6. Jennifer Lynch, FAA Releases Lists of Drone Certificates—Many Questions Left 
Unanswered, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 19, 2012), https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2012/04/faa-releases-its-list-drone-certificates-leaves-many-questions-
unanswered [https://perma.cc/P5ZZ-WTXC]. 
 7. Andy Greenberg, Flying Drone Can Crack Wi-Fi Networks, Snoop on Cell Phones, 
FORBES (July 28, 2011, 2:11 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2011/07/28/
flying-drone-can-crack-wifi-networks-snoop-on-cell-phones/#1a6ff8a066f9 [https://perma.
cc/UX43-HPH5] (discussing drones’ potential for cell phone and wifi hacking). 
 8. Certificates of Waiver or Authorization (COA), FED. AVIATION ADMIN., 
https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ato/service_units/systemops/
aaim/organizations/uas/coa/ [https://perma.cc/YK99-WNMK] (last modified Aug. 19, 2016, 
8:21 PM). 
 9. See Section 333, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., http://www.faa.gov/uas/beyond_the_
basics/section_333/ [https://perma.cc/QAR6-JK2Q] (last modified Sept. 23, 2016, 9:46 AM) 
(explaining the exemption process set forth in Section 333 of the FAA Modernization and 
Reform Act of 2012). 
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Aviation Regulation part 107 went into effect.10  A step towards integration 
of UAS into the National Airspace, part 107 created a straightforward 
licensure and regulatory structure allowing for commercial use of small 
unmanned aircraft.11  The Association of Unmanned Vehicle Systems 
International, a trade group for the larger unmanned vehicle and robotics 
industry, predicts that in the first three years of integration more than 
70,000 jobs will be created in the United States with an economic impact of 
more than $13.6 billion.12  By 2025 an estimated 100,000 jobs, or more, 
will be created and integration will have an economic impact of $82 
billion.13  Most of that value will be tied directly to the data gathered by 
UAS operations.14  However, along with the production of great value 
comes the production of very large quantities of sensitive imagery, data, 
and private information, much the same way Big Data companies such as 
Google or Facebook have created great value by aggregating large amounts 
of private data.15  The issues related to the Big Data phenomenon have been 
 
 10. 14 C.F.R. § 107 (2016).  
 11. The regulations apply to the operation of “civil small unmanned aircraft systems 
within the United States.”  14 C.F.R. § 107.1(a).  Small unmanned aircraft systems are 
defined as those weighing less than 55 pounds at takeoff.  Id. § 107.3.  Several restrictions 
apply to the operation of authorized small UAS: they must be operated at altitudes of less 
than 400 feet, with limited exceptions, id. § 107.51(b); the operator must be in visual line of 
sight with the small UAS at all times, id. § 107.31(a); they may only be operated during 
daylight hours, id. § 107.29, away from clouds, id. § 107.51(d), and away from other 
aircraft, id. § 107.37.  Further, the operator may not operate the small UAS in any controlled 
airspace, id. § 107.41, near any airport, id. § 107.43, or over any group of people, id. 
§ 107.39. 
 12. DARRYL JENKINS & BIJAH VASIGH, ASS’N FOR UNMANNED VEHICLE SYS. INT’L, THE 
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS INTEGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 2 
(2013), http://www.auvsi.org/auvsiresources/economicreport [https://perma.cc/7WKU-
FQJA]. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See id.; U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM (UAS) SERVICE 
DEMAND 2015–2035: LITERATURE REVIEW AND PROJECTIONS OF FUTURE USAGE 94 (2013), 
https://fas.org/irp/program/collect/service.pdf [https://perma.cc/3E88-FJWB] (“While most 
of the UAS industry is focused on a derivative of current military uses for security and 
police operations, the civil industry is looking to use the UAS as a platform to produce 
revenue from the data derived through the sensors.”). 
 15. See id.; Margaret Hu, Small Data Surveillance v. Big Data Cybersurveillance, 42 
PEPP. L. REV. 773, 824 tbl.3 (2015) (describing Google’s cache of consumer web-browsing 
history data as more than 100 petabytes in size, while Facebook has amassed more than 300 
petabytes of user data among posts, comments, and uploaded photos, and YouTube contains 
more than 1,000 petabytes of user-uploaded video content).  See also Brian McKenna, What 
does a petabyte look like?, COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM (Mar. 2013), 
http://www.computerweekly.com/feature/What-does-a-petabyte-look-like [https://perma.cc/
WL4X-HKFY] (describing one petabyte, or one thousand terabytes, as four times the 
4
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explored at some length and overlap significantly with the issues raised by 
UAS use for data gathering.16  The key difference, however, is the length of 
the data chain and the consequent attenuation of potential liability for data 
breaches or negligence.  This Article will explore, at length, this data chain 
and the limitations on liability.  For purposes of this Article, the data 
chain17 contains four links: (1) drone operation itself, (2) in-flight data 
collection, (3) post-flight data processing, and (4) data use, dissemination, 
and storage.  Liability for data breaches in the last two links is well 
settled.18  On the other hand, liability for data breaches in the first two 
links—drone operation and in-flight data collection—is unsettled, and the 
consequences of a breach there is likely different than in the latter two 
links.  Thus, this Article explores liability for UAS operators and general 
data liability for post-flight activities.19 
I. UAS USE FOR DATA GATHERING: LARGE QUANTITIES OF 
POTENTIALLY SENSITIVE IMAGERY, DATA, AND PRIVATE INFORMATION 
Currently, a commercial UAS operator can gather imagery data and 
sell it largely without regulation.20  A hypothetical example of such an 
activity follows: A real estate agency hires a UAS company to capture 
aerial imagery and video for use on the agency’s website.   
The UAS company uses a commercially available off-the-shelf 
quad-rotor drone system equipped with a stabilized high-definition 
camera.21  Such a system is capable of about 15 to 30 minutes of sustained 
 
amount of data collected by the U.S. Library of Congress from its inception until 2011, or 
“enough to store the DNA of the entire population of the US – and then clone them, 
twice.”). 
 16. E.g., Hu, supra note 15. 
 17. For purposes of this Article, I have organized UAS operations into a “chain” that 
begins with operating the drone and ends with uploading any data gathered in-flight to a 
personal computer, server, or other network-enabled device, in order to examine various 
vulnerabilities at each stage of the process. 
 18. See infra Part II. 
 19. An authorized small UAS operator is a person with a remote pilot certificate with a 
small UAS rating or a person manipulating the flight controls of the small UAS under the 
direct supervision of one so certified.  14 C.F.R. § 107.12(a) (2016). 
 20. Joseph J. Vacek, Remote Sensing of Private Data by Drones is Mostly Unregulated: 
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy Are At Risk Absent Comprehensive Federal 
Legislation, 90 N.D. L. REV. 463, 466 (2016). 
 21. This hypothetical example is based on the use of a DJI Phantom 4 drone, which is 
equipped with a 12 Megapixel camera and capable of recording 4k video (3840x2160) at up 
to 30 frames per second.  See Phantom 4 Specs, DJI http://www.dji.com/phantom-
4/info#specs [https://perma.cc/EGJ2-2AVQ] (last visited Dec. 17, 2016). 
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flight, which includes hovering, at altitudes of up to several thousand feet.22  
The electrically powered drone is both extremely agile and stable due to its 
gyroscopic autopilot.23  The imagery gathered by its camera can be stored 
on-board or streamed live back down to the operator or another receiver 
and includes both high-definition video and still images.24  The camera is 
fully gimballed, meaning it can remain focused and zoom-in on a subject of 
interest while the drone maneuvers.25  Naturally, this drone is capable of 
trespassing onto private property, as its operator can fly it beyond the line 
of sight or even into a structure, using the drone’s onboard GPS navigations 
system plus cameras to provide the operator with perspective.26  The drone 
platform also makes quick work of gathering a bird’s-eye view from 
practically any altitude, with the operator a mile or two away.27   
The UAS company would be required to comply with all applicable 
flight-related regulations, such as altitude limitations,28 exclusion from 
protected airspace,29 and weather restrictions.30  The real estate agency 
would have contracted with the UAS company to purchase the data 
gathered, including the intellectual property rights associated with the 
imagery and video.  To differentiate itself, the UAS company advertises 
multi-spectral imagery,31 which allows the real estate agency to capture a 
near-infrared thermal image, overlay it upon a visual image, and add the 
 
 22. Id. (the DJI Phantom 4 has a service ceiling of 19,685 feet above sea level). 
 23. Id. (the DJI Phantom 4 can travel at speeds up to 20 meters per second, or 
approximately 44 miles per hour, and can hover automatically at a fixed point for filming, 
with vertical and horizontal deviations at 0.1 and 0.3 meters, respectively). 
 24. Id. (the operator can view a “drones-eye” view on the ground in 720p video 
(1280x720) at 30 frames per second).  See also supra note 21. 
 25. Id. (while the drone is traveling forward, the camera can pan and rotate freely, 
looking in any direction, from straight down to the ground to straight out to the horizon, and 
anywhere in between). 
 26. Id.  See also supra note 24. 
 27. Id. (the remote control device can transmit and receive signals from the drone from 
up to 2.2 miles away). 
 28. 14 C.F.R. § 107.51(b) (2016). 
 29. Id. § 107.41. 
 30. Id. § 107.51(c). 
 31. See, e.g., Taking Flight: Small Business Utilization of Unmanned Aircraft: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 114th Cong. 31 (2015) (statement of Michael J. Gilkey, 
CEO, 3D Aerial Solutions, LLC) (“The images record reflected sunlight at different 
wavelengths, or ‘colors’.  Different cameras are used to collect in different spectral bands 
(i.e. visible, near infrared and thermal infrared) to provide a variety of techniques for 
analysis.  Multispectral cameras efficiently collect multiple colors simultaneously.”). 
6
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result to the advertisement showing the house’s energy efficiency level as a 
selling point.32 
During the flight, the UAS company used near-infrared thermal 
imagery33 and inadvertently captured high-definition imagery and video of 
a couple in the next yard sharing an intimate moment.  The near-infrared 
camera recorded the scene even though a sunshade hid the couple from 
visual observation.34  Neither the UAS company nor the real estate agency 
detected the error, and the agency later posted the images and video to its 
website.  Soon thereafter, several “prurient interest” sites reposted the 
images.  The couple was identified due to GPS location metadata 
associated with the imagery, ultimately causing the couple embarrassment 
and unwanted publicity. 
Based on these hypothetical facts, a negligence lawsuit seems 
appropriate.  However, the existing laws regulating remote sensing 
activities and data breaches suggest unexpected results in terms of liability 
for UAS-sensed data.  To explain, this Article now turns to vulnerabilities 
in the data chain, followed by an exploration of the law related to the 
collection, use, retention, and dissemination of data gathered by UAS.  
Discussion turns next to limitations on liability for data breach and 
negligence in UAS cybersecurity before ultimately concluding that UAS 
operators are effectively insulated from liability for negligence in the data 
chain beyond flight activity. 
A. Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities Throughout the Data Chain 
Cybersecurity vulnerabilities exist throughout the data chain for 
UAS-sensed data.35  As stated above, the data chain includes four links: (1) 
drone operation itself, (2) in-flight data collection, (3) post-flight data 
processing, and (4) data use, dissemination, and storage.  Vulnerabilities in 
this data chain include sniffing, spoofing, snooping, and sabotage.36  These 
 
 32. See id. at 70 (July 14, 2015 Letter from Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors) (“REALTORS® 
are excited about the potential to use UAS technology to take photographs and video 
footage of property listings for residential, commercial, and land sales or leases.”). 
 33. See M. Annette Lanning, Note, Thermal Surveillance: Do Infrared Eyes in the Sky 
Violate the Fourth Amendment?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1771, 1773–74 (1995) (discussing 
capabilities of forward-looking infrared (FLIR) imaging technology). 
 34. See id. at 1774 (“The FLIR can also detect body heat through a curtain or a thin 
partition.” (citing State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 595 (Wash. 1994) (en banc))). 
 35. Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee—New Task, 80 Fed. Reg. 5880, 5880 
(Feb. 3, 2015). 
 36. See infra Section I.A.2.  See also Stephen E. Henderson & Matthew E. Yarbrough, 
Suing the Insecure?: A Duty of Care in Cyberspace, 32 N.M. L. REV. 11 (2002) (discussing 
negligence liability in the context of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks); Kristin 
7
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vulnerabilities can occur in isolation or combination and may occur during 
flight operations or on the ground, with different ramifications for each 
situation. 
1. Vulnerabilities Unique to UAS Operations 
Each of the cybersecurity vulnerabilities may occur individually or in 
combination in the first link in the data chain.  For starters, UAS are not 
entirely autonomous—all require some level of connection with the 
operator, whether it is a simple radio link directly connecting the controller 
with the aircraft flight controls37 or a sophisticated three-way connection 
between the ground controller, the aircraft flight computer, and the GPS 
navigation satellite system. 38  A malicious actor can cause a loss of control 
by spoofing the controller or GPS signals with stronger, incorrect 
“spoofed” signals.39  The malicious actor broadcasts false location data on 
the same GPS frequencies, which are relatively weak, so the drone relies on 
stronger false signals, resulting in position and navigation errors.40  Drones 
that rely on GPS as part of their navigation or flight control systems are 
vulnerable to a spoofing attack in flight.41  If the spoof is successful, the 
 
Shields, Cybersecurity: Recognizing the Risk and Protecting Against Attacks, 19 N.C. 
BANKING INST. 345, 349–51 (2015) (discussing vulnerabilities in financial institution 
networks, including phishing, malware, and unauthorized access through unsecured 
third-party vendors); Jared Magill, The Crooked Path to Determining Liability in Data 
Breach Cases, WIRED, http://www.wired.com/insights/2015/03/crooked-path-determining-
liability-data-breach-cases/ [https://perma.cc/88CE-KY5S] (discussing the history of 
cybercrime laws in the U.S. and the failed passage of the Personal Data Protection and 
Breach Accountability Act of 2014, S. 1995, 113th Cong. § 101 (2014), which would have 
imposed criminal penalties on businesses entrusted with personally identifying consumer 
data that intentionally failed to disclose breaches of that data). 
 37. See, e.g., John Patrick Pullen, This Is How Drones Work, TIME (Apr. 3, 2015), 
http://time.com/3769831/this-is-how-drones-work/ [https://perma.cc/E3GM-V4XQ]. 
 38. See, e.g., Alberto Cuadra & Craig Witlock, How Drones Are Controlled, THE 
WASHINGTON POST (June 20, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/
national/drone-crashes/how-drones-work/ [https://perma.cc/G7QD-B7PQ]. 
 39. See Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, Drone Hijacking? That’s Just the Start of GPS 
Troubles, WIRED (July 6, 2012, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2012/07/drone-
hijacking/all/ [https://perma.cc/S6EV-SH66] (describing how, in a test conducted by 
researchers from the University of Texas and organized by the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, the researchers successfully hijacked a civilian drone by “spoofing” it 
with faulty GPS data).  
 40. See id. (explaining that GPS signals come from high altitude satellites which makes 
them highly susceptible to intentional and unintentional interference).   
 41. See id. (“The drone, an Adaptive Flight Hornet Mini, was hovering at around 60 
feet, locked into a predetermined position guided by GPS.  Then, with a device that cost 
around $1,000 and the help of sophisticated software that took four years to develop, the 
researchers sent a radio signal from a hilltop one kilometer away.  In security lingo, they 
8
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol39/iss1/3
2017] THE NEXT FRONTIER IN DRONE LAW 143 
UAS will follow the false signals and crash, resulting in a successful 
sabotage.42  If a UAS operator experiences such a scenario, he would be 
potentially liable in tort for damages caused by the crash.43 
Also related to the drone operation link in the chain, malicious actors 
might engage in packet sniffing.  Packet sniffing is a software program or 
hardware device used to intercept and log data traffic that passes through 
it.44  Any data that passes through a network, whether wired or wireless, 
can be vulnerable to a packet sniff, but not all packet sniffing is necessarily 
malicious.45  However, malicious packet sniffing at the first link of drone 
operation can provide the initial information needed to hack the drone later 
or breach the data later in the data chain.46 
The second link in the data chain, in-flight data collection, includes 
the capture of imagery or data from the drone operation by the drone’s 
operator or, in the case of larger drones that have two person crews, a 
dedicated sensor systems operator.  If the UAS operator in our hypothetical 
was streaming data from the UAS down to the controller and the data was 
unencrypted, it would be subject to sniffing and, potentially, snooping.  A 
well-known vulnerability at the collection point of the data chain is simply 
not encrypting the data gathered.47  If the drone broadcasts data to a ground 
 
carried out a spoofing attack.  ‘We fooled the UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) into 
thinking that it was rising straight up,’ says Todd Humphreys, assistant professor at the 
Radionavigation Laboratory at the University of Texas.”). 
 42. See, e.g., id. (“Deceiving the drone’s GPS receiver, [the researchers] changed its 
perceived coordinates.  To compensate, the small copter dove straight down, thinking it was 
returning to its programmed position.  If not for a safety pilot intervening before the drone 
hit the ground, it would have crashed.”).  See also Brandon Bellows, Comment, Floating 
Toward a Sky Near You: Unmanned Aircraft Systems and the Implications of the FAA 
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, 78 J. AIR L. & COM. 585, 608–09 (2013) (discussing 
the vulnerabilities of UAS to GPS spoofing attacks). 
 43. See infra Section II.B. 
 44. See Mani Potnuru, Note, Limits of the Federal Wiretap Act’s Ability to Protect 
Against Wi-Fi Sniffing, 111 MICH. L. REV. 89, 91–92, 91 n.9 (2012) (explaining “passive” 
and “active” scanning for wireless signals and how those techniques are used by packet 
sniffers); Vacek, supra note 20, at 473 & n.51 (discussing packet analyzer software). 
 45. In fact, most Internet and Intranet (closed system) traffic is subjected to 
interception, mostly for network administration purposes of traffic management, security, or 
system health purposes. 
 46. See Potnuru, supra note 44, at 91–92 (explaining how packet-sniffing technology 
may be used to access sensitive information, which may then be used to facilitate other 
crimes). 
 47. See, e.g., Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Unmanned Aerial Exposure: Civil Liability 
Concerns Arising from Domestic Law Enforcement Employment of Unmanned Aerial 
Systems, 85 N.D. L. REV. 623, 631 (2009) (“[U]nencrypted video feeds captured by UAV 
optical sensors could be intercepted by private parties, who might seek to view the 
9
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receiver, anyone listening on the correct frequency can easily receive the 
data as well, much like public media broadcast over the airwaves.  This is 
what happened in 2009 when Iraqi militants used cheap, off-the-shelf 
components to intercept video streamed from a U.S. Military Predator 
operation.48 
As discussed below, the existing regulations for UAS operations are 
silent as to data captured.  However, vulnerabilities begin at the moment of 
capture and operators may expose themselves to liability for not protecting 
potentially sensitive data.49  Potential liability is complex due to issues with 
foreseeability, as discussed below, and a lack of applicable regulatory 
structure.50 
2. General Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities 
The third link in the data chain, post-flight data processing, opens the 
data to a multitude of general cybersecurity vulnerabilities, starting with 
packet sniffing on the ground.  As previously discussed, packet sniffing is 
used to intercept and log data traffic that passes through a network.51  
Malicious packet sniffing can lead to the leak of sensitive data at this point 
in the data chain as well. 
Spoofing refers to an attack on the data security later in the data 
chain.52  Spoofing attacks usually involve a malicious actor attempting to 
 
downloaded video or other imagery that exposes the targets of a UAV’s sensor package to a 
loss of privacy.”). 
 48. Siobhan Gorman, Yochi J. Dreazen & August Cole, Insurgents Hack U.S. Drones, 
THE WALL ST. J. (Dec. 17, 2009, 11:59 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles
/SB126102247889095011 [https://perma.cc/8RKJ-HKW7]; see also David Axe, Iran 
Probably Did Capture a Secret U.S. Drone, WIRED (Dec. 6, 2011), https://www.wired.com
/2011/12/iran-did-capture-a-secret-u-s-drone/ [https://perma.cc/GDD7-JKR2] (discussing 
the reported Iranian recovery of a U.S. RQ-170 spy drone that crashed near the Iran-
Afghanistan border, and speculating that Iran may have downed the drone by use of a signal 
jammer). 
 49. See discussion infra Part II.  
 50. See infra Section II.B. 
 51. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 52. Spoofing refers to any cyber attack that uses, as a method, the substitution of false 
and malicious code or signals in place of the authentic code or signals with the intent that 
the victim remain unaware of the substitution.  See also Kelly A. Gable, Cyber-Apocalypse 
Now: Securing the Internet Against Cyberterrorism and Using Universal Jurisdiction as a 
Deterrent, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 57, 77 n.89 (2010) (“Spoofing is defined as the 
‘appropriation of an authentic user’s identity by non-authentic users, causing fraud or 
attempted fraud, in some cases, and causing critical infrastructure breakdowns in other 
cases.  Spoofing can also target nonuserbased entities.  For instance, an IP address can be 
spoofed to appropriate the identity of a server and not a human (user).’” (quoting 
BERNADETTE SCHELL & CLEMENS MARTIN, WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD HACKER DICTIONARY 
10
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access secure data by masquerading as a legitimate user.53  They may do so 
either as an automated “man-in-the-middle” that inserts malicious code into 
a computer that is used later to disable or snoop, or as a “human spoof,” 
where a person impersonates another who has legitimate access in order to 
obtain insider credentials and access a secure system.54  The human 
“insider threat” is very difficult to protect against, since humans tend to 
trust other humans.55 
Snooping is a sometimes sophisticated56 method57 of gathering and 
aggregating large quantities of user data.58  While the term may refer to 
 
289 (2006))).  Compare supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text (describing spoofing of a 
nonuserbased entity earlier in the data chain, where the “victim” of the spoofed data is the 
drone itself, which mistakes malicious signals for genuine signals), with infra note 53 
(describing spoofing attacks later in the data chain, where the victim is a human user who 
mistakes malicious code for the genuine article).  
 53. Douglas P. Whitlock, Internet Fraud: Preventing and Responding to Phishing and 
Spoofing Scams, 49 N.H. B.J. 30, 30 (2008) (“A spoof website uses the logos, content, and 
general design of the legitimate institution it is impersonating in order to trick the visitor 
into believing that he or she has linked to the legitimate website.”). 
 54.  See Shields, supra note 36, at 349–51, 350 (discussing third-party vulnerability and 
the Target data breach, where “cybercriminals accessed Target’s computer system through 
the security system of a heating and cooling contractor who was working for Target.”  
Because Target’s system saw the HVAC contractor’s system as a trusted user, the   
criminals were able to gain access to the Target system and install their malware); NIELS 
FERGUSON, BRUCE SCHNEIER, & TADAYOSHI KOHNO, CRYPTOGRAPHY ENGINEERING 10 
(2010) (discussing the human element of cyber attacks). 
 55. See FERGUSON, SCHNEIER & KOHNO, supra note 54, at 10 (“[M]any of the really 
harmful attacks are performed by insiders, and a firewall does not protect against insiders at 
all.”). 
 56. Although it may be as simple as eavesdropping on unencrypted communications.  
See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.  
 57. Of course, these methods of exploiting vulnerabilities in the data chain are not 
mutually exclusive.  For example, spyware, which is a form of snooping, is often installed 
on the target system through the use of spoofing, or fooling a user into clicking a link or 
downloading a file that contains malware.  See, e.g., Gable, supra note 52, at 82 (“Spoofing 
attacks are concentrated on impersonating a particular user or computer, usually in order to 
launch other types of attacks.”).  Similarly, phishing is used to effectuate a spoofing attack: 
the cybercriminals send out emails to multitudes of users who may do business with a 
certain bank, posing as the bank, and trick users into entering personal information into 
spoof websites or into clicking links that install malware on their systems, enabling further 
snooping attacks.  See, e.g., Shields, supra note 36, at 349 (“Phishing is when a 
cybercriminal sends an email, text, or pop-up message asking for personal or financial 
information.”); see also id. at 350 (“After phishing compromises a user’s computer, 
cybercriminals can install malware. . . . [which can be used to] monitor and control online 
activity, steal confidential information, and commit fraud.” (footnote omitted)). 
 58. MICROSOFT TECHNET, Common Types of Network Attacks, https://technet.
microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc959354.aspx [https://perma.cc/TF94-H47X] (last visited Dec. 
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legitimate statistical research on public data,59 for this article’s purposes it 
refers to malicious software that runs in the background to access data 
without permission.60  Snooping can occur anywhere in the data chain, but 
for the purposes of analyzing it as a general cybersecurity vulnerability, 
this Article will examine snooping later in the data chain: in the data 
processing link, by theft or unauthorized use in the use and dissemination 
link, or later in the storage link.61  The result is that data essentially “leaks” 
out of an otherwise secure system and is then used for malicious 
purposes.62 
Sabotage, of course, can be the most damaging vulnerability.  While 
difficult to effect in the flight operation phase, data sabotage can result in 
wholesale data destruction or the capture and malicious encryption of data 
later held for ransom and the dubious promise of un-encryption upon 
payment of the ransom.63  Recent data-ransom targets typically include 
 
17, 2016) (“When an attacker is eavesdropping on your communications, it is referred to as 
sniffing or snooping.”). 
 59. For example, it should come as no surprise that a person’s Internet Service 
Provider, or ISP, knows every website that person visits while online.  See, e.g., Lincoln 
Spector, Is Your ISP Spying on You?, PCWORLD (Sept. 3, 2012, 7:42 AM), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/261752/is_your_isp_spying_on_you_.html [https://perma. 
cc/2E84-PGKS] (“Your Internet service provider tracks what IP addresses you contact, 
which effectively means they know the web sites you’re visiting.  They can also read 
anything you send over the Internet that isn’t encrypted.”).  See also Paul Ohm, The Rise 
and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1438 (“How much 
personal information flows through an ISP’s wires and is stored on its computers?  In 
modern connected life, almost no other entity can access as much personal information.”). 
 60. Jason Krause, Beware of Spyware: Litigants Sometimes Resort to Computer 
Snooping, But It Could be a Crime, 91 A.B.A. J. 57, 59 (2005) (“Software that spies on a 
person’s computer is easy to install and very difficult to detect.”). 
 61. For example, in our hypothetical, once the UAS company uploads the video onto its 
system, it would be vulnerable to a snooping attack, even before it was transmitted to the 
real estate agency if, for example, the UAS company had unwittingly installed spyware onto 
its system. 
 62. While snooping is typically associated with malicious software, or “spyware,” 
snooping may also be done using hardware, which may be harder to detect.  See Krause, 
supra note 60, at 55 (describing the “KeyKatcher,” a keylogging snooping device that plugs 
in between the keyboard and computer, as “so small and innocuous it looks like part of the 
keyboard PS2 connector.”). 
 63. See, e.g., Robert McMillan, In the Bitcoin Era, Ransomware Attacks Surge, WALL 
ST. J. (Aug. 19, 2016, 11:59 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/in-the-bitcoin-era-
ransomware-attacks-surge-1471616632 [https://perma.cc/9XML-TKV2] (describing one 
victim’s payment of $500 in Bitcoin to hackers in order to unencrypt his Excel and Word 
documents that the hackers had maliciously encrypted by use of a virus or other malware). 
12
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hospital and patient records,64 but imagery and data gathered by drones 
could easily be subject to the same scheme.65  To return to our hypothetical 
and adjust it slightly, if the data processors withheld the images and video 
of the couple’s intimate moments from public publication, the images 
would still be vulnerable to a sabotage (or ransom) attack if hackers 
managed to access the stored data and get the images. 
The fourth link in the data chain includes data use, dissemination, and 
storage.  Like the third link, data in use, dissemination, or storage is 
vulnerable to a multitude of cyber attacks, either human or bot-based, 
starting with software or hardware-based packet sniffing that usually leads 
to either a spoof attack or a continuous snooping attack facilitated by 
malicious software installed on the user’s processor or storage device.66  
Data sabotage is a vulnerability in the fourth link as well.67  Akin to a 
human virus or disease pandemic, more travel and human contact correlates 
to a higher infection rate; similarly, the more a dataset or information 
packet travels and the more Internet contact occurs, the higher the exposure 
to software viruses or malware.68 
The cybersecurity vulnerabilities just discussed are neither novel nor 
solely a problem in the UAS industry, but they raise interesting questions 
because of the leveraged data gathering capabilities drones provide. 
B. Lack of Regulation for Collection, Use, Retention, and Dissemination 
of Imagery, Data, and Information by UAS 
The regulatory scheme for aviation activities and consequent liability 
for negligence in aviation operations is well established.69  Two primary 
 
 64. Kaveh Waddell, A Hospital Paralyzed by Hackers, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 17, 2016) 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/02/hackers-are-holding-a-hospitals-pat
ient-data-ransom/463008/ [https://perma.cc/AQA4-AGZG]. 
 65. Indeed this is increasingly likely as ransomware attacks have been rising at an 
alarming rate.  See McMillan, supra note 63 (“According to the U.S. Department of Justice, 
ransomware attacks have quadrupled this year from a year ago, averaging 4,000 a day.”). 
 66. Because the use, dissemination, and storage of the data subjects it to the same 
computing platforms and network vulnerabilities as the post-data flight processing that 
occurs in the third link, the vulnerabilities are largely the same.  See supra notes 52–65 and 
accompanying text. 
 67. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text. 
 68. This vulnerability makes sense when one considers the structure of the internet.  As 
data travels from host computer to host computer, it is subject to potential compromise or 
infection at each step. 
 69. See Mgmt. Activities Inc. v. United States, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (C.D. Cal. 1998) 
(providing a comprehensive aggregation of the duties of care and law applicable to 
aviators); Merritt v. Shuttle, Inc., 187 F.3d 263, 268–70 (2d Cir. 1999) (discussing appellate 
subject matter jurisdiction as appropriate in aviation matters). 
13
Vacek: The Next Frontier in Drone Law: Liability for Cybersecurity Negli
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2017
148 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1 
factors contributed to a regulatory and legal regime that supports one of the 
statistically safest industries—air transportation—in the domestic United 
States.70  First, the enabling statutory language for the Federal Aviation 
Administration (“FAA”) requires the agency to consider safety first, above 
all other considerations.71  Second, the aviation administrative law system 
enforces aviation regulations under the principle of “safety first” while 
following Chevron’s72 deference to the FAA.73  FAA enforcement actions 
are subject to independent judicial review by an administrative law judge 
(ALJ), the National Transportation Safety Board (N.T.S.B.),74 and finally, 
the federal courts.75 
In 2014, the N.T.S.B., in Huerta v. Pirker, established that UAS are, 
in fact, aircraft subject to FAA regulation.76  The FAA Administrator 
assessed a $10,000 fine against respondent Raphael Pirker in 2012 for 
Pirker’s allegedly negligent or reckless operation of a Ritewing Zephyr 
drone near the campus of the University of Virginia, which violated 
existing FAA regulations.77  Pirker was accused of flying the drone within 
ten feet of the ground, at altitudes up to 1,500 feet, through a traffic-filled 
tunnel, and within 100 feet of an active heliport.  Pirker allegedly used the 
drone to run down a pedestrian on the sidewalk such that the hapless 
individual was forced to “take immediate evasive maneuvers so as to avoid 
being struck by the aircraft.”78  Pirker moved to dismiss the Administrator’s 
Order of Assessment, arguing that the regulation he allegedly violated only 
applied to aircraft, but not to “model aircraft.”79  The ALJ agreed and 
 
 70. How Aviation Safety Has Improved, ALLIANZ, http://www.agcs.allianz.com/insights
/expert-risk-articles/how-aviation-safety-has-improved/ [https://perma.cc/FG53-YSSN] (last 
visited Dec. 17, 2016). 
 71. 49 U.S.C. § 40104(a) (2012). 
 72. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (holding 
that where Congress has delegated regulatory authority to a federal agency which has 
provided an administrative interpretation of an otherwise silent or ambiguous portion of a 
statute within which it has been delegated authority, “the question for the court is whether 
the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”). 
 73. 49 C.F.R. § 821 (2016).  
 74. Id. § 821.2.  
 75. Id. § 821.64(a).  
 76. Huerta v. Pirker, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5730, 2014 WL 8095629, at *5 (N.T.S.B. 
Nov. 17, 2014) (granting Chevron deference to the FAA Administrator’s prior interpretation 
of what constitutes an “aircraft” under 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(6) and 14 C.F.R. § 1.1). 
 77. Id. at *1.  The regulation giving rise to the charge was 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a) (2016), 
which proscribes, inter alia, operation of an aircraft “in a careless or reckless manner so as 
to endanger the life or property of another.”  Id. 
 78. Huerta, at *1 (quoting the complaint).  
 79. Id. at *8. 
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dismissed the Administrator’s Order of Assessment.80  The Administrator 
appealed to the N.T.S.B., which reversed the ALJ and held that “an 
‘aircraft’ is any ‘device’ ‘used for flight in the air.’  This definition includes 
any aircraft, manned or unmanned, large or small.”81   
The robust existing system of aviation regulations, however, is silent 
as to regulating the data chain—the collection, use, retention, and 
dissemination of any imagery, data, or information gathered by UAS flight 
operations.  The FAA simply has no statutory or adjudicated authority to 
regulate it.  However, judging by the amount of time and effort devoted to 
discussing privacy issues related to UAS operations,82 the industry and the 
FAA are clearly aware of the problem. 
Even though the FAA has no authority to regulate the data chain, the 
agency continues to address it.83  Incorporation by reference of a 
satisfactory privacy regulatory scheme would be effective.  Incorporation 
of other federal statutes or regulations is not foreign to the Federal Aviation 
Regulations.  For example, regulations on hazardous lithium batteries 
contained in the Hazardous Material Regulations section of the Code of 
Federal Regulations (“CFR”) are incorporated into the Aviation CFR.84  No 
suggestion of such an incorporation for data protection has been made 
either by the FAA or commentators.  Therefore, it appears that a 
comprehensive regulatory structure for the data chain of remotely sensed 
data by drones does not exist.85 
Federal laws regulating certain aspects of cybersecurity and the data 
chain do, of course, exist.  The problem is that they set up only coarse, 
piecemeal regulation of remotely sensed data.  The relevant existing federal 
laws related to remote sensing by drones include the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”),86 the Privacy Act,87 and even the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.88  The ECPA, which 
 
 80. Id. at *11. 
 81. Id. at *5 (quoting 14 C.F.R. § 1.1). 
 82. See Press Release—DOT and FAA Finalize Rules for Small Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (June 21, 2016), https://www.faa.gov/news/
press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=20515 [https://perma.cc/4LJY-EH5K] (last visited 
Dec. 18, 2016). 
 83. Id. 
 84. 14 C.F.R. § 171.2(e). 
 85. Vacek, supra note 20. 
 86. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 
1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
 87. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 § 3 (codified as amended at 
5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012)). 
 88. U.S. CONST. amend IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
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includes the Wiretap Act,89 the Stored Communications Act,90 and the Pen 
Register Act,91 generally prohibits the unauthorized interception and use of 
the contents of electronic communications.92  A drone equipped with 
remote sensing equipment tuned to eavesdrop on a particular bandwidth 
would intercept electronic communication if it were eavesdropping on the 
content.93  While the ECPA proscribes such activity, the prohibition does 
not apply to the interception of non-content, or metadata.94  Metadata 
includes information similar to that found on the outside of a traditionally 
addressed and mailed private, sealed letter: the sender, receiver, their 
addresses, and the date of mailing.95  Digital metadata can include routing 
information as well.  Thus, since the ECPA addresses only one potential 
use of UAS, it ceases to apply once data is gathered in the first and second 
links of the data chain. 
Applicable to data further down the chain is the Stored 
Communications Act (“SCA”),96 which, through the ECPA, protects data 
 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized.”). 
 89. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, tit. 3, sec. 802, §§ 2510–
2520 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2510–2522).   
 90.  Electronic Communications Privacy Act § 201 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–
2710). 
 91.  Electronic Communications Privacy Act § 301 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–
3126). 
 92. 18 U.S.C. § 2510. 
 93. “‘[E]lectronic communication’ means any transfer of signs, signals, writing, 
images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, 
radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or 
foreign commerce . . . .”  § 2510(12). 
 94. See Vacek, supra note 20, at 471 n.33 (“Metadata is data that describes other data, 
which includes structural information and descriptive information.”). 
 95. This is distinguished from content data, or the contents inside the hypothetical 
envelope.  “Contents” is a defined term under the ECPA, which means “when used with 
respect to any wire, oral, or electronic communication, includes any information concerning 
the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication.”  18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (emphasis 
added).  This distinction is significant because certain provisions of the ECPA proscribe 
only the disclosure of contents of wire, oral, or electronic communications, and thus, by 
negative implication, do not apply to the disclosure of metadata.  See, e.g., § 2702(a)(1) (“a 
person or entity providing an electronic communication service to the public shall not 
knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of a communication while in 
electronic storage by that service . . . .” (emphasis added)); Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to 
the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1208, 1221 (2004) (“§ 2702 has slightly different exceptions depending on whether 
the information to be voluntarily disclosed consists of content or noncontent information.”). 
 96. §§ 2701–2710. 
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stored on a server.  While the ECPA generally protects data in transit, the 
SCA aims to prevent unauthorized access to data stored by third-party 
providers.97  The statute is considered overly complex, and there is some 
discussion of what exactly constitutes “stored communications” depending 
on length of time the data remains on a particular server, whether it is 
opened or not, and whether the communication is deemed “content” or 
“non-content.”98  Generally speaking, however, the SCA is likely the most 
relevant federal law to illuminate the data chain problem presented here.  
Given the statutory duty of care imposed on data storage providers,99 its 
narrow definitions only apply to a few applications of UAS gathered 
data.100  This leads to an important distinction: Data voluntarily provided to 
an aggregator, such as a Facebook user sharing private information about a 
romantic experience, is subject to the contractual terms of the user 
agreement.101  Therefore, Facebook does not violate the SCA through 
disclosures of that data if made pursuant to the terms of its user agreement, 
to the extent that those terms are lawful.102  Such user agreements often 
provide consent for the aggregators to use the data in a multitude of 
ways.103  For UAS-gathered data, such as our hypothetical couple’s 
intimate moment, there is no such user agreement and no such consent 
given.  Absent the knowing disclosure of information by the electronic 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 95, at 1227–28.  
 99. Albeit only in narrowly defined circumstances, assuming such data provider is a 
“public” provider, since the SCA has been held by implication not to apply to “nonpublic 
providers,” Andersen Consulting, LLP v. UOP, 991 F. Supp. 1041, 1042 (N.D. Ill. 1998) 
(“[T]he statute covers any entity that provides electronic communication service (e.g.,        
e-mail) to the community at large.”), and only in the event that voluntary disclosure by the 
provider is not permissible pursuant to one of the many statutory exceptions to the SCA, 
§ 2702(b).  
 100. First, § 2702 only applies to public data providers.  See supra note 99.  Second, the 
prohibition on voluntary disclosure in § 2702(a) does not apply to the voluntary disclosure 
of non-content data, or metadata, as discussed supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.  
Finally, even content data may be voluntarily disclosed with the user’s consent.  
§ 2702(b)(3). 
 101. See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Propertization Metaphors for Bargaining Power and 
Control of the Self in the Information Age, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 69, 79–81 (2006) (arguing 
that, in the face of increasingly overbearing contracts of adhesion in the Internet context, 
consumer data should be recognized as a property right and either protected as such or held 
to be inalienable as a matter of law). 
 102. § 2702(b)(3) (providing that public providers may voluntarily disclose the contents 
of a communication “with the lawful consent of the originator . . . .”). 
 103. See, e.g., FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms [https://perma.cc/7X7D-
CH8F] (last visited Dec. 18, 2016). 
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communication service provider, the narrow protections offered by the 
SCA are not helpful in most data breach situations. 
Continuing with the issue of consent, Congress enacted the Privacy 
Act of 1974 to set limits on federal agencies’ collection, maintenance, use, 
and dissemination of personally identifiable information about 
individuals.104  As codified, the act contains twelve exceptions allowing 
disclosure of data without consent.105  The relevant exceptions for liability 
for cybersecurity issues include a “need to know” within an agency,106 
“routine uses,”107 and law enforcement requests.108  Those exceptions only 
apply to government agency use, however.  Much more commonplace 
collectors, maintainers, users, and disseminators of data are commercial 
entities such as Google, Facebook, LexisNexis, and Thomson Reuters.  The 
Privacy Act does not apply to private companies such as those listed.109  
Therefore, users of private data services do not enjoy any federal 
protections under the Privacy Act or under the Stored Communication Act 
if they have waived those rights in user agreements. 
Finally, given recent decisions about consensual release of data, even 
the Fourth Amendment and remote sensing cases fail to establish a 
comprehensive structure to adequately address the data chain problem.110  
In United States v. Skinner, law enforcement tracked the defendant’s 
location information, broadcasted from his mobile phone, without a search 
warrant.111  The defendant argued that the Fourth Amendment prohibits 
such warrantless tracking as unreasonable.112  The Court held that mobile 
 
 104. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 § 2(b)(1)-(2) (“The purpose 
of this Act is to provide certain safeguards for an individual against an invasion of personal 
privacy by requiring Federal agencies, except as otherwise provided by law, to–(1) permit 
an individual to determine what records pertaining to him are collected, maintained, used, or 
disseminated by such agencies; (2) permit an individual to prevent records pertaining to him 
obtained by such agencies for a particular purpose from being used or made available for 
another purpose without his consent . . . .”). 
 105. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). 
 106. § 552a(b)(1). 
 107. § 552a(b)(3). 
 108. § 552a(b)(7). 
 109. See § 522a(b) (“No agency shall disclose any record . . . .”) (emphasis added)); 
§ 552a(a)(1) (incorporating the definition of agency as codified in 5 U.S.C. § 522); 
18 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) (defining “agency” as “any executive department, military 
department, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other 
establishment in the executive branch of the Government (including the Executive Office of 
the President), or any independent regulatory agency”). 
 110. See, e.g., United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 780 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 111. Id. at 775. 
 112. Id. at 777. 
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phone users have no “reasonable expectation of privacy in the data given 
off” by their devices.113  Other relevant remote sensing cases include 
Florida v. Jardines, in which the Court compared a drug-sniffing dog’s 
nose to a remote sensor,114 and United States v. Jones, in which the Court 
prohibited the warrantless use of a GPS tracker on a suspect’s vehicle.115  
However, in both Jardines and Jones, the Court held that Fourth 
Amendment searches occurred because of physical trespass.116  When read 
together, those cases suggest that warrantless surveillance of metadata by 
law enforcement and governmental agencies is largely permitted so long as 
no physical intrusion occurs.  This, along with the prevalence of “contracts 
of adhesion” by large companies requiring users to consent to third-party 
access of their data, together yield the result that citizens and consumers 
who use technology in even the most basic ways functionally waive control 
over their data.117  Private data appears to have scant legal protection 
anywhere after the second link in the data chain. 
Since federal law does not give meaningful protection to data gathered 
by drone, an injured plaintiff may turn to traditional tort law for a remedy.  
As with products liability, where manufacturers of products retain liability 
throughout the product’s life, the question arises whether UAS operators, 
as “producers” of the data product, similarly retain liability.  “The 
contractor who builds the scaffold invites the owner’s workmen to use it.  
The manufacturer who sells the automobile to the retail dealer invites the 
dealer’s customers to use it.”118  Does not the UAS operator who gathers 
the data invite the use of that data?  The invitation may be to a specific 
person or an indeterminate class, “but in each case it is equally plain, and in 
each its consequences must be the same.”119  Should not the consequences 
of a data breach be attributable in some way to the producer of that data, 
like products liability? 
 
 113. Id.  
 114. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1416–17 (2013). 
 115. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 116. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417; Jones at 951–52. 
 117. See, e.g., Barnhizer, supra note 101, at 71–72 (“The modern reality of highly 
sophisticated forms of adhesion contract—browse-wrap and click-wrap contracts—appears 
to exacerbate the lack of assent and take-it-or-leave-it nature of consumer adhesion 
contracts.  As some commentators have noted, the fiction of consumer assent to such new 
forms of adhesion contracts is even more absurd than with their paper-based counterpart.  
Just as with the relatively crude paper-based contracts, few consumers ever bother to read 
these terms, and the nature of online contracting permits producers to hide their boilerplate 
terms far more effectively than even the finest of fine prints.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 118. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1054 (N.Y. 1916). 
 119. Id. 
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It appears that the rule of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company—that 
a duty of care exists if a product reasonably expected to be dangerous is 
negligently made and is known to be used by those other than the original 
purchaser120—may have an exception for UAS data.  Even though the sale 
of a data product would ordinarily be subject to products liability laws, 
liability for data breaches or negligence on the part of the original data 
gatherer (the UAS operator) is problematic due to attenuation.121  Article III 
standing requirements and third-party liability limitations effectively leave 
potential plaintiffs without a remedy in tort because they may not be 
foreseeable users of UAS data or victims of its unauthorized 
dissemination.122  
Unfortunately for the couple from our hypothetical, even a 
technological solution is not a viable protector of their private moments.  
Vulnerabilities in general,123 in the software code used for flight controls or 
navigation,124 and in data and server management125 will persist as long as 
“informal code” is used.126  “Informal code” describes the vast majority of 
software—it works well enough most of the time but might have bugs or 
errors.127  On the other hand, “formal code,” where computer logic is 
subject to mathematical proof at each step of an operation, results in each 
step of the software code returning a single possibility, closing the 
“backdoors” and bugs that cybercriminals exploit.128  However, such secure 
technology comes at a significant price—slow processing speeds and huge 
amounts of necessary memory for the simplest operations.129  Similarly, 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. See infra Part II. 
 122. See infra Part II. 
 123. See Kevin Hartnett, Computer Scientists Close in on Perfect, Hack-Proof Code, 
WIRED (Sept. 23, 2016, 8:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/09/computer-scientists-
close-perfect-hack-proof-code/ [https://perma.cc/5RAJ-9NKA]. 
 124. Alan Kim et al., Vulnerabilities Analysis for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, AM. INST. 
OF AERONAUTICS & ASTRONAUTICS, CYBER ATTACK 6–13 (2012), https://pdfs.
semanticscholar.org/1a95/4775dd9a2596b7543af7693d707415077289.pdf [https://perma.cc
/7DN3-NKHA].  
 125. Andrew V. Schmidt, Note, Cyberterrorism: Combating the Aviation Industry’s 
Vulnerability to Cyberattack, 39 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 169, 181–84 (2016) 
(discussing cyber vulnerabilities in the aviation industry). 
 126. See Hartnett, supra note 123 (discussing informal and formal computer codes). 
 127. See id. (“[M]ost computer code . . . is written informally and evaluated based 
mainly on whether it works . . . .”). 
 128. Id. (“[F]ormally verified software reads like a mathematical proof: Each statement 
follows logically from the preceding one.  An entire program can be tested with the same 
certainty that mathematicians prove theorems.”). 
 129. Id. (“[A] program that includes its formal verification information can be five times 
as long as a traditional program that was written to achieve the same end.”). 
20
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol39/iss1/3
2017] THE NEXT FRONTIER IN DRONE LAW 155 
blockchain authentication,130 a cybersecurity protocol where each 
subsequent operation requires the verification of all prior operations, also 
requires significant computing power to run.131  UAS are limited by weight 
due to aerodynamic considerations and limited in battery life due to those 
weight limitations.132  Therefore, the use of small, lightweight processors, 
flight controllers, and sensors is necessary.133  Small UAS simply cannot 
carry the batteries or computing power required to run formal code or block 
chain authentication.134  Even if the energy or processing requirements 
were solved, the expense to do so is likely prohibitive. 
Fears of privacy invasions, such as the involuntary exposure of the 
hypothetical couple’s intimate moment, spurred President Obama to order 
an independent agency review of the lack of a privacy and data 
management regulatory structure as applied to UAS operations in 2015.135  
The process was conducted by the National Telecommunications 
Information Agency136 and produced a concise best practices document, 
 
 130. Bitcoin uses block chain authentication to effectively prevent fraud.  See Jay 
Schulman, How Bitcoin Could Prevent Real Estate Fraud in Cook County, CHICAGO (Dec. 
9, 2016), http://www.chicagomag.com/city-life/December-2016/Cook-County-Bitcoin-
Blockchain/ [https://perma.cc/2J9E-BCDE]. 
 131. See Trevor I. Kiviat, Note, Beyond Bitcoin: Issues in Regulating Blockchain 
Transactions, 65 DUKE L.J. 569, 579 & n.70 (2015) (explaining that the blockchain 
validation system powering Bitcoin is dependent on the network participants’ 
“computational power,” which “essentially refers to how fast a machine can perform an 
operation.”). 
 132. See supra notes 21–27 and accompanying text (describing limitations of a typical 
consumer-grade UAS). 
 133. The DJI Phantom 4, for example, weighs in at 1380 grams, or about 3 pounds.  See 
supra notes 21–27 and accompanying text.    
 134. Recall that small UAS must have a combined takeoff weight of less than 55 pounds, 
supra note 11.  Compare the 3-pound weight of the DJI Phantom 4 with that of the U.S. 
military’s well-known Predator drone, which weighs 1,130 pounds when empty and takes 
off carrying up to 665 pounds of fuel and an additional 450 pound payload.  U.S. AIR 
FORCE, MQ-1B Predator (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display
/tabid/224/Article/104469/mq-1b-predator.aspx [https://perma.cc/6BNR-NP4A].  
 135. Promoting Economic Competitiveness While Safeguarding Privacy, Civil Rights, 
and Civil Liberties in Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed. Reg. 9355, 
9357 (Feb. 20, 2015) [hereinafter Presidential Memo], https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-
2015-02-20/pdf/2015-03727.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VHV-AZSJ] (“There is hereby 
established a multi-stakeholder engagement process to develop and communicate best 
practices for privacy, accountability, and transparency issues regarding commercial and 
private UAS use in the NAS.  The process will include stakeholders from the private 
sector.”). 
 136. Id. (“Within 90 days of the date of this memorandum, the Department of 
Commerce, through the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, and 
in consultation with other interested agencies, will initiate this multi-stakeholder 
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which is discussed below.137  Around the same time, various other federal 
agencies and private industry actors also produced their own best practices 
and internal guidance documents related to privacy and data chain 
management in UAS operations.138  Together, these guidance documents 
may establish a duty of care for UAS operations. 
C. Best Practices Documents for Collecting and Managing Sensitive or 
Private Data That Are Voluntary Only 
A study conducting a broad review on commercial drone literature in 
research, magazine, and news databases from 2010 to 2015 identified key 
areas of social and ethical concerns related to commercial drone use.139  
The most frequently cited concern was in the area of law and regulation 
with privacy issues falling closely behind.140  It is reasonable to conclude 
that concerns of law and regulation overlap both categories of flight 
operations as well as cybersecurity, since privacy issues would not be a 
relevant concern but for drones’ abilities to conduct remote sensing 
activities of private activities.  Similar concerns led UAS operators, 
including governmental operators,141 universities,142 and the industry 
itself,143 to produce several guidance documents during the same timeframe 
that indicate a discipline-specific focus on the difficult questions of data 
privacy and cybersecurity.  Taken together, these guidance documents may 
 
engagement process to develop a framework regarding privacy, accountability, and 
transparency for commercial and private UAS use.”). 
 137. See Multistakeholders convened by Nat’l Telecomms. & Info. Admin., Voluntary 
Best Practices for UAS Privacy, Transparency, and Accountability (2016) [hereinafter 
Voluntary Best Practices], https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/uas_privacy_
best_practices_6-21-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/97UH-GN3L]. 
 138. See, e.g., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., WORKING GROUP TO SAFEGUARD PRIVACY, 
CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DEPARTMENT’S USE AND SUPPORT OF UNMANNED 
AERIAL SYSTEMS 2 (2012) [hereinafter DHS MEMO], https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/working-group-to-safeguard-privacy-civil-rights-and-civil-liberties-in-the-
departments-use-and-support-of-unmanned-aerial-systems-uas-s1-information.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3KSN-PXKE]; Code of Conduct, ASS’N FOR UNMANNED VEHICLE SYS. INT’L, 
[hereinafter AUVSI Code of Conduct] http://www.auvsi.org/content/conduct [https://
perma.cc/CPN3-BBW5]. 
 139. Rocci Luppicini & Arthur So, A Technoethical Review of Commercial Drone Use in 
the Context of Governance, Ethics, and Privacy, 46 TECH. IN SOC’Y 109, 111–12 (2016). 
 140. Id.  
 141. See, e.g., DHS MEMO, supra note 138. 
 142. See, e.g., U.N.D., Committee on Unmanned Aircraft System Research Ethics & 
Privacy, https://und.edu/research/resources/uas-research-ethics-privacy.cfm [https://perma.
cc/EX4T-MNKP]. 
 143. AUVSI Code of Conduct, supra note 138. 
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equip future courts with enough evidence of an industry-wide standard of 
care for UAS cybersecurity throughout the data chain.144 
In the interim, the broader UAS industry had the opportunity to 
comment on a “best practices” forum hosted by the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) pursuant to a 
2015 Presidential Memorandum.145  The Memorandum established 
UAS-specific guidelines for federal agencies to protect privacy, 
accountability, transparency, and reporting, including a requirement for 
agencies to “at least every 3 years, examine their existing UAS policies and 
procedures related to the collection, use, retention, and dissemination of 
information obtained by UAS . . . .”146  The NTIA forum produced a “best 
practices” document intended to provide guidance to all UAS operators.147  
Even though the document itself claims that it is not intended to establish a 
standard of care or the basis for statutory or regulatory obligations, a court 
could find it does establish such a standard of care, in whole or in part, if 
sufficient evidence of use exists.148  Part IV of the document, titled 
“Voluntary Best Practices,”149 includes five elements directly applicable to 
privacy and data chain management.150 
Overall, these best practices request that operators simply provide 
notice and act reasonably.151  Upon closer examination, however, the best 
practices implicitly recognize the inherent privacy problem framed by this 
Article—that once gathered, data receives very little protection and 
potential plaintiffs have very little recourse.  A footnote in the best 
practices document sums it up nicely: “These Best Practices recognize that 
UAS operators may not be able to predict all future use of data.  
Accordingly, these Best Practices do not intend to discourage unplanned or 
innovative data uses that may result in desirable economic or societal 
 
 144. Voluntary Best Practices, supra note 137. 
 145. Presidential Memo, supra note 135. 
 146. Id. at 9355–56. 
 147. See Voluntary Best Practices, supra note 137, at 5 (“These voluntary Best Practices 
for UAS focus on data collected via a UAS, which includes both commercial and non-
commercial UAS.”). 
 148. Id. at 2 (“In some cases, these Best Practices are meant to go beyond existing law 
and they do not—and are not meant to—create a legal standard of care by which the 
activities of any particular UAS operator should be judged.”). 
 149. Id. at 5. 
 150. Id. at 5–6.  These five elements are: (1) Inform others of your use of UAS;         
(2) Show care when operating UAS or collecting and storing covered data; (3) Limit the use 
and sharing of covered data; (4) Secure covered data; and (5) Monitor and comply with 
evolving federal, state, and local UAS laws.  Id.  
 151. See id. 
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benefits.”152  This statement supports an inference that the “exciting 
possibilities that come with [UAS]” may trump the “responsible, ethical, 
and respectful” duties and “commitment to transparency, privacy, and 
accountability” outlined for UAS operators by the Voluntary Best 
Practices.153 
Even if a court finds the duties and standards suggested by the 
Voluntary Best Practices have become a de facto standard of care for UAS 
remote sensing activities, existing law—including constitutional standing 
requirements and third-party liability limitations—probably limits UAS 
operators’ liability for breaches in the data chain, depending on where in 
the data chain the breach occurs. 
II. LIMITED LIABILITY FOR DATA BREACHES  
The liability issues related to cybersecurity and database breaches 
have been discussed in terms of standing,154 duty under tort law,155 and in 
other contexts, such as security breaches of financial service providers,156 
and communication and user privacy in social media.157  The legal 
principles that limit liability in those contexts apply similarly in UAS 
remote sensing and the data chain context.158  Current standing 
requirements159 as applied to data breaches frequently deprive potential 
plaintiffs of standing.160  Third-party liability limitations also limit potential 
plaintiffs’ abilities to sue, because well-established principles of tort law 
applied to data breach cases usually prevent recovery absent a business or 
 
 152. Id. at 5 n.3. 
 153. Id. at 2. 
 154. Arthur R. Vorbrodt, Note, Clapper Dethroned: Imminent Injury and Standing for 
Data Breach Lawsuits in Light of Ashley Madison, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 61 
(2016). 
 155. Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort Liability, 
57 S.C. L. REV. 255 (2005). 
 156. Huggins v. Citibank, 585 S.E.2d 275 (S.C. 2003). 
 157. Christopher J. Borchert, Fernando M. Pinguelo & David Thaw, Reasonable 
Expectations of Privacy Settings: Social Media and the Stored Communications Act, 13 
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 36 (2015). 
 158. See infra Section II.A. 
 159. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (discussing the three 
requirements for standing) (citations omitted); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 
101–02 (1983) (discussing the injury requirement of standing) (citations omitted). 
 160. See infra Section II.A. 
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legal relationship, which is usually lacking between the UAS operator and 
the subject whose data is breached.161 
A. Article III Standing Requirements: Precluding Negligence Lawsuits in 
Data Breach Cases 
Whether a person injured by a data breach has constitutional standing 
has been addressed by multiple courts at the state and federal levels.  The 
Seventh162 and Ninth163 Circuits answered in the affirmative, and the Third 
Circuit in the negative.164  In Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, the 
Supreme Court addressed standing for future injuries comparable to those 
which may occur in data breach cases.165  Commentators have interpreted 
Clapper to impose stricter requirements for standing: plaintiffs must be 
able to show future injury is “certainly impending.”166  Notwithstanding 
Clapper’s more stringent requirement, the majority also noted that standing 
may be available to plaintiffs showing a “substantial risk” of injury.167  
Requiring plaintiffs alleging future injuries from a data breach to meet a 
stricter requirement by showing an injury is “certainly impending” would 
effectively bar most data breach plaintiffs from proceeding.168  On the other 
hand, applying the “substantial risk” standard would provide data breach 
plaintiffs an easier time showing injury in fact.  Still, however, they must 
satisfy the other two elements of standing. 
For plaintiffs alleging injury due to data breach caused by a snooping 
drone, the actual flight activity may be their only recourse—such as 
 
 161. See generally, e.g., Durkee v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 742, 
748 (W.D.N.C. 2011) (“The duty owed by a defendant to a plaintiff is determined by the 
relationship subsisting between them.” (citing Kientz v. Carlton, 96 S.E.2d 14, 17 (N.C. 
1957))); Durden v. United States, 736 F.3d 296, 304 (4th Cir. 2013) (“In general, there is 
neither a duty to control the actions of a third party, nor to protect another from a third 
party.” (quoting Scadden v. Holt, 733 S.E.2d 90, 92 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012))).  See also infra 
Section II.B. 
 162. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 163. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 413 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated and remanded, 
135 S. Ct. 1540, 1545 (May 16, 2016) (holding that the Ninth Circuit failed to consider in 
detail the particularity and concreteness of plaintiff’s injury and accordingly remanded for 
analysis of both standing requirements). 
 164. Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 165. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
 166. Bradford C. Mank, Clapper v. Amnesty International: Two or Three Competing 
Philosophies of Standing Law?, 81 TENN. L. REV. 211, 214 (2014). 
 167. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1150 n.5 (citations omitted). 
 168. See, e.g., Mank, supra note 166; Whalen v. Michael Stores Inc., 153 F. Supp. 3d 
577 (E.D.N.Y. 2015); Khan v. Children’s Nat’l Health Sys., No. TDC-15-2125, 2016 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 66404, at *3–7 (D. Md. May 19, 2016). 
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trespass in our hypothetical couple’s case.  Showing “certainly impending” 
damages due to the leaked intimate videos would be more difficult than 
showing a “substantial risk” of injury.  As the imagery and video become 
widely distributed on the Internet, the harm to the hypothetical couple’s 
reputation may increase while, paradoxically, the legal harm becomes more 
attenuated.  Data breach cases related to financial or identity fraud, such as 
that in Reilly v. Ceridian Corp.,169 illustrate this phenomenon.  In Reilly, the 
plaintiff’s data, stored by defendant, was hacked.170  The plaintiffs were 
notified of the breach and later sued, alleging risk of future harm.171  The 
court held that mere allegation of future harm did not meet constitutional 
standing requirements, despite the cost incurred with monitoring credit.172 
On the other hand, in Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, where 
hackers breached the retailer’s database and stole customers’ credit card 
numbers, the court found that costs directly associated with monitoring 
credit scores to guard against potential future fraud met the Clapper 
requirement for “certainly impending injury.”173  For our hypothetical 
couple, there would be no threat to their credit.  Their privacy and 
reputation were injured but, absent financial repercussions, they would not 
meet the standing requirement. 
Most recently, a district court suggested that standing exists in a data 
breach case when a plaintiff can show either: “(1) actual examples of the 
use of the fruits of the data breach for identity theft, even if involving other 
victims; or (2) a clear indication that the data breach was for the purpose of 
using the plaintiffs’ personal data to engage in identity fraud.”174 
From these cases, it seems that unless a data breach specifically harms 
an individual financially, the footholds needed to scale the slope of 
standing would be absent175  However, the vast majority of data breach 
plaintiffs do not articulate a direct legal or financial harm as a result of the 
 
 169. Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 170. Id. at 40. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 43–46. 
 173. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 174. Khan v. Children’s Nat’l Health Sys., No. TDC-15-2125, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
66404, at *14 (D. Md. May 19, 2016). 
 175. Data breach plaintiffs tend to be single members of huge classes or single data 
points in huge databases.  The data breach in Reilly affected approximately 27,000 people, 
664 F.3d at 40, while the breach at issue in Remijas affected 350,000, 794 F.3d at 690.  The 
2013 Target Corp. breach affected an estimated 40 million consumers.  Gregory Wallace, 
Target Credit Card Hack: What You Need to Know, CNN (Dec. 23, 2013, 11:43 AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2013/12/22/news/companies/target-credit-card-hack/ [https://perma
.cc/RR4A-3GPP]. 
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data breach.176  Many do, of course, suffer attenuated harm, such as the 
hassle and expense of obtaining new credit cards, closing compromised 
accounts, or fixing inaccurate credit reports.  But each link in the data chain 
further attenuates the harm with the eventual result that, legally, the injury 
becomes speculation.177 
For those like our hypothetical couple who are injured by data 
breaches affecting their privacy, becoming an unwilling public figure on 
the Internet occurs after the first two links of the UAS data chain—drone 
operation and data processing.  The UAS operator’s liability for the flight 
ends there due to third-party limitations such as foreseeability in tort and 
lack of privity in contract.178   
B. Third-Party Liability Limitations: Precluding Negligence Theory 
Against UAS Operators 
The landmark case of Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. 
established the limits of a third-party’s duty and directly applies to the data 
chain problem.179  “The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to 
be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within 
the range of apprehension.”180  A reasonable person would likely feel 
apprehensive about a data breach compromising her sensitive information, 
and the first part of the Palsgraf rule suggests that entities managing the 
data chain would be liable for the risk of data breach as one that is 
“reasonable to be perceived.”  Under Palsgraf, a UAS operator must satisfy 
its duty of care for flight operations and data gathering by ensuring any 
 
 176. See, e.g., Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 637 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(affirming dismissal of putative class action seeking relief for data breach because the class 
members had no compensable damages, chiefly because the court, faced with a novel 
question under Indiana law, believed that “Indiana law would not recognize the costs of 
credit monitoring that the plaintiffs seek to recover in this case as compensable damages.”). 
 177. See, e.g., In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 1304, 
1309 (D. Minn. 2014) (declining to dismiss class members’ negligence claim against Target, 
related to the data breach mentioned supra, where class members argued that “Target’s own 
conduct, in failing to maintain appropriate data security measures and in turning off some of 
the features of its security measures, created a foreseeable risk of the harm that occurred, 
and Plaintiffs were the foreseeable victims of that harm.”).  In the case of a UAS operator, 
like the one in our hypothetical who has no relationship to the victims, liability in 
negligence will turn on the foreseeability of the breach.  It is arguably more foreseeable that 
a UAS will crash during flight and cause injury, or allow a passerby to recover an onboard 
camera and its contents, than it is that data captured from it will be hacked or exploited 
somewhere down the data chain. 
 178. See supra notes 162–77 and accompanying text. 
 179. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
 180. Id. at 100. 
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imagery or video streamed down from the aircraft to the remote operator is 
not inadvertently leaked, such as by broadcast on a public frequency.  Since 
that is a known vulnerability in the flight and data gathering phases, it is 
likely a reasonably perceivable risk.181  A data breach due to a public data 
transmission is likely a foreseeable event and thus would incur consequent 
liability for the UAS operator.  A UAS operator, like the one that 
inadvertently captured the hypothetical couple’s intimate moment, could 
probably refute a negligence claim by the couple that they had a duty to 
avoid capturing the intimate imagery.  A UAS operator may reasonably 
claim to be in a similar position as the railroad in Palsgraf—unable to 
foresee the results of a photo lawfully taken several steps down the data 
chain—and argue that no duty runs back up the data chain from the 
plaintiff.  Importantly, in Palsgraf there was a legal relationship between 
the parties—Ms. Palsgraf purchased a train ticket from the defendant 
railroad company.182  A UAS operator engaged in remote sensing activities 
of third parties has no legal relationship with the third parties, and the lack 
of such a relationship would likely provide an effective defense to a 
negligence suit. 
Second, most data breaches are the result of malicious criminal acts by 
third parties intent on stealing the data.183  In this far more common 
scenario, Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp. would 
apply, in which a landlord owed no duty “to provide protection commonly 
owed by [law enforcement]”184 or to be “an insurer of the safety of his 
tenants.”185  Under Kline, the hypothetical UAS operator likewise has no 
common-law duty to protect the remotely sensed data from cybercriminal 
hacking attempts such as sniffing, snooping, or spoofing. 
A database provider, like a landlord, owns server space where data is 
stored and would not, under Kline, have a duty to protect potential 
cybercrime victims against criminal cyber attack.  Courts have directly 
addressed the question of whether there exists a common-law duty of care 
for data possessors to secure user data from theft by cybercriminals.  In 
Huggins v. Citibank, the plaintiff sued the bank because a third-party 
cybercriminal opened a credit account in the plaintiff’s name.186  The 
 
 181. See id. at 100 (discussing foreseeability). 
 182. Id. at 99 (“Plaintiff was standing on a platform of defendant’s railroad after buying 
a ticket to go to Rockaway Beach.”). 
 183. VERIZON, 2016 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 3 fig.3 (2016), 
http://sova.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/rp_DBIR_2016_Report_en_xg-1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/T28F-3VS6]. 
 184. Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 487 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Huggins v. Citibank, 585 S.E.2d. 275, 276 (S.C. 2003). 
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plaintiff alleged the bank had a minimal duty to protect the plaintiff by 
verifying the identity of the credit applicant before issuing the card.187  The 
Court found that “in order for negligence liability to attach, the parties must 
have a relationship recognized by law as the foundation of a duty of 
care.”188  Most people would probably consider their financial data to be 
the most deserving of legal protection, but “[t]he relationship, if any, 
between [banks and victims of credit card fraud] is far too attenuated to rise 
to the level of a duty between them.”189  This line of reasoning extends to 
less sensitive areas of data privacy, such as software virus infections of 
home computers with a similar result.190  Extending the analysis to UAS 
operators, Huggins creates similar results for our hypothetical couple—the 
UAS operator owes no duty of care to protect the couple’s privacy because 
there is no legal relationship between the parties. 
As a final note, it bears remembering that a contract may modify 
common-law duties of care.191  A real estate agency may impose a duty 
upon UAS operators to take certain precautions with their customers’ or 
third-party beneficiaries’ data.  Likewise, a contractual duty may require a 
server space provider to protect server users against criminal cyber attack.  
However, this Article focused on the default setting: the lack of a 
regulatory structure for data gathering by UAS and the potential common 
law liability between victims of data breaches and the UAS operator absent 
special relationships or contractual liability. 
 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 277. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See Emily Kuwahara, Note, Torts v. Contracts: Can Microsoft Be Held Liable to 
Home Consumers for its Security Flaws?, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 997, 1025–31 (2007) (arguing 
for an extension of products-liability law to cover software programs, invalidation of 
warranty disclaimers used by software companies, and an exception to the economic loss 
rule for software-related data breach losses). 
 191. Of course, depending on the facts, a breach of a contractual duty may give rise to a 
breach of contract action, rather than a cause of action sounding in negligence.  See, e.g., 
Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Rex Title Corp., 282 F.3d 292, 293 (4th Cir. 2002) (“In 
general . . . Maryland does not recognize a cause of action for negligence arising solely from 
a contractual relationship between two parties.” (citing Heckrotte v. Riddle, 168 A.2d 879, 
882 (Md. 1961))).  But see Eli Research, Inc. v. United Commc’ns Grp., LLC, 312 F. Supp. 
2d 748, 758 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (“A duty to act for negligence purposes may flow from a 
contract or statute or may be implied from attendant circumstances.” (citing Huyck Corp. v. 
C.C. Mangum, Inc., 309 S.E.2d 183, 187 (N.C. 1983))); Hardin v. York Mem’l Park, 730 
S.E.2d 768, 776 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (“[A] duty of care may arise out of a contractual 
relationship, the theory being that accompanying every contract is a common-law duty to 
perform with ordinary care the thing agreed to be done, and that a negligent performance 
constitutes a tort as well as a breach of contract.” (quoting Olympic Prods. Co. v. Roof Sys., 
Inc., 363 S.E.2d 367, 371 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988))). 
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CONCLUSION 
Under current law, UAS operators are effectively relieved of liability 
for negligence in the data chain beyond flight activity.  Existing federal law 
does not address liability for cybersecurity negligence or data breaches in 
UAS operations.  Further, current interpretations of Article III standing 
requirements coupled with a lack of a required standard of care for UAS 
operators to protect against cyber attack by third parties.  These realities 
result in the lack of a legal remedy for people whose private data is 
captured by drone and later compromised in a cybersecurity breach. 
Data breach plaintiffs struggle to meet Article III standing 
requirements.  Unless they can show more than an attenuated threat and 
meet the “concrete and particularized injury that is actual or imminent” or 
“certainly impending,”192 they will not be able to state a claim that at some 
point in the data chain someone had at least a reasonable duty of care 
specific to the plaintiff and breached that duty, or even to argue the UAS 
operator produced a data product and should be liable under the 
MacPherson products liability rule. 
For the hundreds of thousands of data breach victims193 who cannot 
meet both the standing requirements and articulate a special duty of care, 
there is no remedy under current law.  Neither the existing federal statutes 
governing data nor the Electronic Communications Privacy Act nor the 
common law provide an effective remedy to people whose data has been 
compromised. 
From the perspective of UAS operators who, by virtue of their 
employment or business activities, are actively engaged in gathering data 
that has great value for both legitimate users and for hackers and digital 
miscreants, that same lack of remedy provides a welcome liability shield 
for liability beyond two links in the data chain: (1) the UAS operation and 
(2) in flight data collection.  It appears UAS operators are also effectively 
shielded from liability for data breaches in the final two links in the data 
chain: (3) post-flight data processing, and (4) data use, dissemination, and 
storage. 
 
 192. See supra notes 169–72 and accompanying text. 
 193. See supra note 175. 
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